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The Fifteenth Amendment to the Bangladesh Constitution removed the provision for elections
under a non-political caretaker government, which allowed for three successful elections in the
country. The removal of the non-political caretaker government provision resulted in countrywide
violence and an election without participation by the major opposition groups in 2014. This article
studies the context in which recent constitutional amendments, (in relation to the non-political
caretaker government) have been passed, particularly the Fifteenth Amendment to the Bangladesh
Constitution. The article argues that constitutional amendments in Bangladesh have been used in
an instrumentalist way for political expediency which, in turn, gives electoral advantage to the
ruling party. Democratic institutions and institutions of accountability have been utilised by
successive governments in order to pass constitutional amendments that favour the ruling party.
The article highlights the Special Committee Report on the Fifteenth Amendment and the
Thirteenth Amendment judgment by the Supreme Court, which declared the caretaker government
provision unconstitutional and therefore gave the government the legitimacy it required to amend
the Constitution. The study of constitutional amendments in relation to the non-political caretaker
government provision also illustrates how political parties have demanded or rejected
constitutional amendments depending on whether they are in government or in the opposition.
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The Constitution of Bangladesh came into operation on 16 December 1972, and has been
observed to be ‘truly a democratic Constitution’.1 The Constitution established that it would be the
supreme law of the country, protecting fundamental rights, and providing for a parliamentary form
of government amongst other provisions. Article 142 of the Constitution conferred power on
Parliament to amend the Constitution through a two-third majority in Parliament. The amendatory
process is justified as an essential requirement in any constitution in order to be able to fix
imperfections within a constitution and allows it to change alongside societal progression
throughout time.2 However, while an amendatory process is essential to the stability of a
constitution over time, it also opens up scope for abuse by legislatures and constitutions can be
amended in a way that they begin to reflect the will of particular political interests rather than the
will of the people.
In a research paper published by the Australian Parliament, Scott Bennett noted the following:
“[n]ot the least of the criticisms of the (political) parties has been the inconsistency in their stance
on constitutional amendment. Most notably this has involved supporting issues while in
government, which are then opposed when submitted by their opponents”.3 This is not an
uncommon observation about political parties. Another study observed that one of the major
challenges for constitutional reform is the enticement in politics to focus on short-term, partisan
gain.4 The study cites examples from eight countries and highlights that, in reforming
constitutions, the interest of the incumbent or current political elite strongly affects the direction of
the reform, and short-term interests of the incumbent can often take precedence over long-term
national interest.5 There are different ways in which political party interest can overtake the
amendatory process including private interests and partisan interests. Private interests refer to the
personalized ambition of the party leadership while partisan interest refers to the interest of
specific political parties and how these interests are promoted through constitutional amendment.6
In Bangladesh, soon after the Constitution came into operation, constitutional amendments have
been used in order to change the nature of the polity and serve the interests of the ruler or the
ruling party.
To date, there have been fifteen amendments made to the Bangladesh Constitution. Of these,
the most important are the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Twelfth, Thirteenth and Fifteenth. In 1974, only two
years after the Constitution came into operation, Sheikh Mujib, the first president of the country,
used a supermajority in Parliament to pass the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which
replaced the parliamentary form of government with a presidential form, established a one party
system, and curtailed the powers of the Jatiyo Sangsad (National Parliament). After the murder of
Sheikh Mujib and his family in 1975, Bangladesh entered into fifteen years of autocratic rule.
During this time, President Zia used Parliament to pass the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution,
which legitimized all the actions of the martial law authority between 1975 and 1979. The Fifth
Amendment also deleted secularism as one of the basic principles of state and inserted the words
‘Bismillah-ar-Rahman-Ur-Rahim’ (‘In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful’) into
the preamble, in order to gain support from the Muslim majority of the country. In similar fashion,
President Ershad used the Seventh Amendment to legitimize his regime. The Eighth Amendment
declared Islam the state religion; the Twelfth Amendment repealed the Fourth and returned
Bangladesh to the original parliamentary form of government. Other amendments during the
authoritarian years were also used to manipulate the basis of the formation of the nation in order
to promote each leader’s version of Bangladeshi identity.7
1Mahmudul Islam, Constitutional Law of Bangladesh, 18 (2 nd ed., 2012).
2Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 Harvard Law
Review 386, 387 (1983).
3Scott Bennett, Politics and Public Administration Group, The Politics of Constitutional Amendment Parliament of
Australia (23 June, 2003), http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_
Library/pubs/rp/rp0203/03rp11.
4Martin van Vliet, Winluck Wahiu, Augustine Magolowondo, Anne-Mieke van Breukelen, Constitutional reform
processes and political parties: principles for practice (NIMD, The Hague, 2012).
5Id.
6Vliet, supra note 4 at 15–16.
7See generally, Tazeen M. Murshid, State, nation, identity: The quest for legitimacy in Bangladesh, 20 Journal of
South Asian Studies 1 (1997).
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This article examines the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Bangladesh
Constitution insofar as they relate to the non-political caretaker government (NCG) provision and
the political circumstances under which they were passed. The Thirteenth Amendment provided for
the routine assumption of power by an interim, unelected, NCG, usually headed by a former Chief
Justice, prior to every national election. In a country mired in political confrontation and mistrust
between political parties, this provision allowed for three successful national elections with an
alternation of power at each of the elections. However, the Fourteenth Amendment passed in
May 2004 made the caretaker government controversial by raising the retirement age of Supreme
Court judges. The immediate past Chief Justice usually headed the NCG and the Fourteenth
Amendment led to accusations that the retirement age was raised in order to ensure that the next
head of the NCG would be a Chief Justice loyal to the government. Following major political crisis
and violence protesting the Fourteenth Amendment a state of emergency was declared in 2007
that lasted for two years. After the emergency upon Bangladesh’s returned to democratic rule the
constitutionality of the NCG was challenged at the Supreme Court. In 2011, the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (the Bangladesh Supreme Court constitutes of the High Court
Division and the Appellate Division) declared the NCG provision, (and therefore the Thirteenth
Amendment) unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the basic structure of the
Constitution, namely democracy, because the interim government was an unelected one.8
However, the Court also held that the NCG provision should be kept in place for the next two
parliamentary elections in order to maintain peace and stability in the country.9 A Special
Committee on the Fifteenth Amendment was also formed in order to advise Parliament a year
before the amendment was passed. The Special Committee had unanimously resolved that the
NCG provision ought to be retained,10 however, curiously it did not state this decision in the final
report. The Awami League (AL) government, which has been in power since 2008, oversaw the
passage of the Fifteenth Amendment in 2011, which repealed the Thirteenth Amendment.11 Despite
dissent from the opposition, civil society and voters, the AL led supermajority Parliament
disregarded the direction given by the Court that the NCG should remain in place for two more
national elections.
The two largest political parties in Bangladesh, the AL and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party
(BNP), have both argued for and against the NCG provision, depending on whether they have
been in government or in opposition: the institution of the NCG has always been supported by the
opposition and resisted by the incumbent. It was the AL, which initially rallied for the NCG system
when it was in opposition in 1996, refusing to take part in the usual constitutional processes and
going to the streets when their demand was not met, while the BNP stated a NCG would be
undemocratic and unconstitutional. In 2014, the tables turned and the BNP took to the streets and
demanded reinstatement of the NCG provision, while the AL argued that it is unconstitutional and
undemocratic. In the sections that follow, this article illustrates how constitutional amendments
have fallen prey to the tug of war between these two political parties and how they have tried to
use amendments in order to manipulate the NCG provision so that it would serve their partisan
requirements.
This article highlights the 2011 Appellate Division judgment on the Thirteenth Amendment and
the Special Committee proceedings on the Fifteenth Amendment, arguing that these institutions
and judgments have been manipulated in an attempt to lend credibility to a controversial
amendment. The study of constitutional amendments in relation to the NCG and the background
conditions that prompted such reform provides a method of studying when politicians have been
willing to reassess the Constitution, and to what extent amendments have reflected the interests
and aspirations of the people in terms of how they wish to be governed. This article shows how
constitutional reform in Bangladesh and the demand or rejection of the NCG by political parties,
has been used instrumentally to serve party political expediency as opposed to reflecting the will
of the people of the time.
8Abdul Mannan Khan v. Bangladesh, 64 DLR (AD) 169.
9Id.
10From the proceedings of the fourteenth meeting of the Special Committee on the Fifteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, held on 29 March 2011. Copy of the proceedings on file with the author. Translations are the author’s
own.
11Bangl. Const. (Fifteenth Amend.) Act, 2011.
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2. INCREASING PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITIES AND THE EASY PASSAGE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: THE PATHOLOGIES OF POLITICS IN BANGLADESH
The People’s Republic of Bangladesh is a unitary state with a unicameral Parliament (known as
the Jatiyo Sangshad (hereinafter, JS)) consisting of 300 directly elected members from single
territorial constituencies. There are also provisions for indirectly elected reserved seats for
women.12 Directly elected members are elected on a first-past-the-post basis. There is no
requirement for an absolute majority and no turnout requirement. Since 1991, elections in
Bangladesh have been held every five years (except between 2007-2008 during a two year state
of emergency declared by the army-backed NCG), with an alternation of power each time, until the
latest national election held on 5 January 2014.
Article 142 of the Constitution confers power on Parliament to amend the Constitution.
The procedural requirements for constitutional amendments are slightly different and stricter than
the requirements for normal Bills. A Bill for the amendment of the Constitution must contain a
long title expressly stating that it seeks to amend a provision of the Constitution, and must
mention which provision it seeks to amend. A Constitutional Amendment Bill must be passed by
at least a two-third majority in Parliament before it can be presented to the President for his or
her assent and the President has only seven days to return the Bill or is deemed to have given
assent.13 The procedure set down by Article 142 are non-derogable and any diversion from the
procedural requirements will render the amendment void. While an amendatory provision is
commonplace within constitutions, the Bangladesh Constitution has an added provision, which
has been one of the greatest burdens for democratic consolidation. Article 70 of the Bangladesh
Constitution prohibits floor-crossing14 by the members of Parliament. This has far reaching
consequences on accountability and the proper role of Parliament as the watchdog that keeps the
executive in check.15
The requirement of a two-third majority for constitutional amendments was inserted into the
Constitution with a view of making the passage of constitutional amendments difficult, requiring
broad consensus from parliamentary representatives. However, Bangladeshi Parliaments show a
trend of increasingly strong majorities, (Table 1 is an illustration of the increasingly strong
majorities in Parliament since 1991) and coupled with the ban on floor-crossing, this means that
any Bill introduced by the government gets passed with an overwhelming majority.
Sobhan argues that the principal feature of Bangladesh’s democratic politics is the emergence of
a stable two-party system – the BNP and the AL. The duopolistic dominance of the two major
parties, he argues has “ . . . encouraged their insensitivity to the concerns of minor parties, their
direct supporters, their voters and even to the concerns of their party rank and file”16 – the sense
of arrogance within the leadership of both parties being premised on the belief that within the
duopolistic system, the voters have no option but to vote for one party or the other. The
immediate result of this ‘hegemonistic perspective’ of the two dominant parties, according to
Sobhan, has been to perpetuate the exclusionary exercise of parliamentary power by both the AL
and the BNP. In his words: “(In) successive Parliaments, the majority parties have denied equitable
time-sharing with the opposition both in Parliament as well as over the official electronic media.
Nor have successive regimes made any more than token attempts to consult the opposition on
issues of policy and governance.”17 This exclusionary mode of politics is seen as one of the
primary reasons for driving the opposition out of Parliament and into the streets, the end result
being a dysfunctional Parliament.18
12Bangl. Const. art. 65.
13Bangl. Const. art. 142.
14Floor-crossing occurs when a member of a parliamentary party votes against their party.
15Sabbir Ahmed, Article 70 of the Constitution of Bangladesh: Implications for the Process of Democratisation,
30 BIISS Journal, Jan. 2010 at 24.
16Rehman Sobhan, Structural Dimensions of Malgovernance in Bangladesh, Economic and Political Weekly.
4 Sep. 2004, at 4101.
17Id.
18M. Moniruzzaman, Party Politics and Political Violence in Bangladesh, Issues Manifestation and Consequences,
16 South Asian Survey, 2009, at 81.
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The reason for Bangladesh’s ‘dysfunctional democracy’ has been partly attributed to the
‘historical baggage’ carried by the dynastic leaders of the two main political parties,19 the BNP and
the AL – both of which question the very legitimacy of the other to participate in politics. Being
dynastic, the parties are characterized by a lack of internal democracy with a highly centralized
and personalized internal governance structure vesting near absolute power in the party
chairperson.20 The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee’s (hereinafter, BRAC) ‘State of
Governance in Bangladesh, 2006’21 report terms this “the rise of partyarchy,” a system where the
winning party enjoys the monopoly of power for the duration of their electoral term. As the report
notes, “[t]he innermost circle has de facto command over the entire party, legislature,
parliamentary committees, procurement policies, development allocations, bureaucracy and law
and order enforcement agencies.”22 Thus, ruling parties hardly face any resistance when passing
constitutional amendments. And these amendments have been strategically calculated in order to
protect the continuing rule of the incumbent. The study of the constitutional amendments in
relation to the NCG provision will illustrate the author’s contention.
3. THE BACKGROUND TO THE NCG AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
In 1991, Bangladesh returned to a parliamentary form of government after fifteen years of
authoritarian rule under President Ershad. Political parties united to oust President Ershad and
joined together with a common demand for a non-party caretaker government for the purpose of
holding elections. Elections held under Ershad’s rule throughout the 1980s were mired in
controversy, and Gyasuddin Molla writes that Ershad resorted to many of the same tactics of
control as his predecessor Ziaur Rahman.23 Both Zia and Ershad attempted to use electoral
politics in order to legitimise their authoritarian regimes, and Bangladesh had not experienced
credible elections under a democratic regime since 1973.24 Historically, politicians and voters had
little reason to trust in elections and electoral institutions in Bangladesh,25 and so the central
demand in the late 1980s was for elections under a NCG.
The movement against Ershad reached its height in November 1990 when the opposition
alliance, (consisting of the BNP, the AL, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and other smaller parties and
alliances) gave a joint declaration stating that they would boycott and resist any elections under
the present regime and that they would only join polls to elect a Parliament under a caretaker





Number of seats belonging to
the ruling party (Coalition)
Fifth (1991) BNP 158
Seventh (1996) AL 179
Eighth (2001) BNP (Four Party Alliance) 216
Ninth (2008) AL (Grand Alliance) 262
Tenth (2014) AL 245
Source: www.parliament.gov.bd
Notes: 1. Opposition is MPs of parties not supporting the government or government coalition except for the 2014 election when JP, an
AL ally, formed the opposition after the election.
2. Government MPs include all MPs of government coalitions.
3. Women’s reserved seats, which are indirectly elected are not included.
19For an account of the history of the AL and the BNP and sources of personal antagonism between the two
leaders, Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, see, Stanley A. Kochanek, Patron-Client Politics and Business in Bangladesh
(Sage Publications, 1994).
20Mohammad Mozahidul Islam, The Toxic Politics of Bangladesh: A Bipolar Competitive Neopatrimonial State?,
21 Asian Journal of Political Science, 153-154 (2013).
21Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, (hereinafter, BRAC) is the largest NGO in Bangladesh.
22Manzoor Hasan, et al., The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006, Centre for Governance Studies, BRAC
University & BRAC Research and Evaluation Division, 20 (December, 2006).
23Gyasuddin Molla, Democratic Institution Building Process in Bangladesh: South Asian Experience of a New Model
of a Caretaker Government in a Parliamentary Framework, Working Paper No. 3, 6, South Asia Institute Department of
Political Science, University of Heidelberg, (2000).
24Nizam Ahmed, From Monopoly to Competition: Party Politics in the Bangladesh Parliament (1973–2001),
76 Pacific Affairs 55, 60 (2003).
25Habib Zafarullah and Muhammad Yeahia Akhter, Non-Political Caretaker Administrations and Democratic Elections
in Bangladesh: An Assessment, 35 Government and Opposition, 345, 347 (2000).
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government headed by a “non-partisan and neutral person who will not be associated with any
political party directly or indirectly, and he will not contest the elections of President, Vice-
President or Parliament. No minister of his caretaker government will participate in any election.”26
Ershad’s government was unable to resist this demand, and Shahabuddin Ahmed, the Chief Justice
at the time, was handed power in accordance with Article 50 of the Constitution. This was possible
because Shahabuddin Ahmed replaced the incumbent Vice President. He then assumed the
presidency after Ershad resigned.27 Shahabuddin Ahmed then formed a caretaker government in
order to hold a national election for Parliament. Elections were held on 27 February 1991, and
were generally observed to be free and fair.28
The BNP formed the first democratically elected government since 1973, but within a few years
of its tenure the AL and other opposition parties began to accuse it of manipulating the electoral
process and institutions.29 Bangladesh faced a serious political crisis for two years from 1994, until
fresh elections were held in June of 1996 under a NCG.30 The political deadlock that ensued began
in March 1994 with the Magura parliamentary by-election. The main opposition party, the AL, along
with the JP and JI, charged the BNP government with vote-rigging and began to agitate for the
appointment of a NCG to supervise new elections.31 According to Article 123 of the Constitution,
new elections would have to be held in February 1996. To press home their demand, the
opposition parties boycotted Parliament en masse and enforced a series of hartals (nationwide
strikes). When the BNP government continued to refuse to budge on the NCG issue, naming the
demand undemocratic and unconstitutional, all 147 members of Parliament of the three opposition
groups resigned on 28 December 1994. The BNP dissolved Parliament in November 1995 and
planned to hold elections within 90 days of the dissolution as per Article 123 of the Constitution.
The opposition continued to threaten electoral boycott unless a NCG was put in place via
constitutional amendment.32
On 15 February 1996, parliamentary elections were held without the participation of any major
opposition parties. The elections resulted in a landslide victory for the BNP, which won 289 of the
300 seats. However, voter turnout was less than 15 per cent of the eligible electorate, and it is
thought by most analysts and independent observers that the BNP engaged in massive vote-
rigging.33 The elections were reminiscent of those held under previous authoritarian rulers in
Bangladesh, and confirmed that Bangladeshi political parties were not ready to hold neutral
elections under a majoritarian government. The failure of the election added fuel to the opposition
demand for the creation of a NCG to conduct elections, and the opposition parties declared an
indefinite non-cooperation movement beginning on 9 March 1996.
Finally, the BNP government gave in and the BNP-controlled Parliament passed the Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. The Thirteenth Amendment changed the original Constitution in
that it provided for a NCG to oversee elections once Parliament was dissolved, rather than the
Prime Minister and other Ministers holding office until the general parliamentary election was held.
It mandated an eleven-member NCG to conduct the election. The immediate past Chief Justice was
the first choice to become the head of the NCG. After incorporating the Thirteenth Amendment into
the Constitution, elections were held on 26 March 1996. The AL came to power and the elections
were generally accepted as free and fair.34 However, while the Thirteenth Amendment followed
opposition and civil society demands, it was passed without dialogue with the opposition or other
sectors of society, without the input from parliamentary committees, and by a Parliament without
an opposition, resulting in several weaknesses in the NCG provision.35
The NCG provision allowed for three successful elections, but from its creation it was also flawed
on many levels. It was vague about the tenure of the interim government, and it provided for the
26Molla, supra note 23, at 6.
27Zafarullah & Akhter, supra note 25, at 351.
28Zafarullah & Akhter, supra note 25, at 354.
29Molla, supra note 23, at 10.
30Stanley A. Kochanek, Bangladesh in 1996: The 25th Year of Independence, 37 Asian Survey, 136 (1997).
31Golam Hossain, Bangladesh in 1994: Democracy at Risk, 35 Asian Survey 172 (1995).
32Kochanek, supra note 30, at 136.
33Molla, supra note 23, at 6.
34Zafarullah & Akhter, supra note 25, at 361.
35Ali Riaz, Bangladesh in Turmoil: A Nation on the Brink? Testimony before the Subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States House of Representatives (November 20, 2013).
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former Chief Justice to head the NCG. This led to allegations that Supreme Court judges are
increasingly recruited on the basis of systematic political calculation in order to ensure that the
near future Chief Justice, who heads the NCG, will remain loyal to the appointing party.
The Thirteenth Amendment also created an opportunity for the power of the Prime Minister and
the President to be concentrated in one individual. Despite these flaws, the NCG worked well until
2006 when the system faced its first serious crisis.
4. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE EMERGENCY OF 2007
In 2001, the BNP was once again in power and introduced the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment raised the number of reserved seats for women, made it mandatory to
put up portraits of the Prime Minister in government offices, and raised the retirement age of
Supreme Court judges by two years, amongst other provisions. The Fourteenth Amendment was
widely viewed as a partisan decision favoring the ruling party’s objectives because—with the rise
in retirement age—the next NCG would be headed by a perceived BNP-inclined Chief Justice, KM
Hasan.36 KM Hasan would not have been the first choice to head the NCG had the retirement age
not been raised.37According to the Thirteenth Amendment, the President would choose the Chief
Advisor from amongst recently retired Chief Justices, but traditionally it was expected that the last
retired Chief Justice would lead the NCG.38 By raising the retirement age of judges, KM Hasan
would become the last retired Chief Justice before the next parliamentary election and he could be
appointed as the head of the NCG in accordance with previous practice. The Fourteenth
Amendment was strongly opposed by opposition groups and civil society on the grounds that
raising the retirement age of Supreme Court judges would make both the judiciary and the NCG
controversial. Opponents argued that the Fourteenth Amendment could lead to accusations that
judicial appointments were being made in order to ensure that the head of the NCG would be
sympathetic to the appointing party.39 Despite protests, the controversial Amendment was passed
without bipartisan support or extensive public consultation.40
As the BNP’s second term during Bangladesh’s democratic phase was coming to an end in
October 2006, the opposition led by the AL raised their objection to the appointment of KM
Hasan, as the head of the NCG because of his past involvement with the BNP.41 The opposition
parties alleged that the Fourteenth Amendment raised the retirement age of Chief Justices so that
the ruling party could appoint KM Hasan as Chief Advisor of the NCG.42 Although KM Hasan
eventually refused to take this office, his possible appointment became one of the major issues
leading to the violence, which in turn led to the declaration of emergency in 2007. The Fourteenth
Amendment—a controversial amendment passed in the face of vehement opposition, during an
opposition boycott of Parliament—serves as an example of how constitutional amendments in
Bangladesh’s recent history have become politicized and serve the interests of the ruling party at
the expense of national interest.
Parliament was dissolved in October 2006 after the government’s five-year term, as stipulated in
the Constitution, and a NCG was appointed in order to hold elections. However, the opposition AL
and its allies accused the BNP and its allies of installing its supporters into the NCG and the
Election Commission (EC), and claimed that the voter list was grossly inflated.43 D.T. Hagerty notes
that “[t]he NCG and EC were demonstrably tilted towards the BNP, and election specialists noted
that Bangladesh had a voting-age population of roughly 80 million people but a voter list totaling
93 million.”44 The AL boycotted these elections and announced that it would struggle to prevent
36Supriya Singh, Bangladesh in 2006: Teetering political edifice and democracy, Institute of Peace and Conflict
Studies Special Report (No. 35, March 2007).
37Id.
38Farooq Sobhan, Bangladesh: The Present Situation And Future Outlook, Socio-Political and Economic Challenges
in South Asia, 91 (Tan Tai Yong ed., SAGE Publications, 2009).
39Haroon Habib, A controversial amendment, 21 Frontline: World Affairs, 5-18 (5 June 2004).
40Id.
41Singh, supra note 36, at 1–2.
42Morshedul Islam, Assumption of the Office of Chief Advisor of the Non-Party Caretaker Government in
Bangladesh: A Critical Politico-Legal Analysis, 7 Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization, 21 (2012).
43Singh, supra note 36, at 3–4.
44D.T. Hagerty, Bangladesh in 2007: Democracy interrupted, political and environmental challenges ahead, 48 Asian
Survey, 177,178 (2008).
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them from taking place. The prevention strategy consisted of widescale street agitation, violence,
and the declaration of hartals.
Following months of political wrangling, and the opposition’s prevention strategy of non-stop
hartals and violence, the then President, Iajuddin Ahmed declared himself the Chief Advisor of the
NCG, overlooking other possible constitutional options.45 The opposition intensified its protests,
forcing Iajuddin Ahmed to resign from the post of Chief Advisor on 11 January 2007.46 On the
same day, President Iajuddin declared a state of emergency. The elections, which were to be held
on 22 January 2007, were postponed indefinitely, and the sitting NCG (which the AL accused of
being partisan) was replaced by a new NCG. The officials of the new NCG were drawn mainly from
the private sector. The main agenda of the new NCG comprised an anti-corruption drive amongst
politicians and businessmen, and the task of reforming the electoral system and holding elections.
The new NCG had the backing of the army and the international community, but concerns existed
about the role of the army in the formation of the NCG and the extent of its control over the
transitional government during its two-year tenure.47 During the emergency administration, the
NCG interpreted its mandate broadly, and arrested thousands of politicians and businessmen on
charges of corruption. Most of the charges did not stand in court, and the anti-corruption drive
itself became plagued by the perception of political favouritism, and according to NGO observers
had “limited impact on reducing overall corruption.”48 The two-year state of emergency, and the
delay in holding elections, led to anxiety about whether Bangladesh would return to democratic
rule, weakening the legitimacy of the NCG.49
The NCG finally held elections on 29 December 2008, and the AL came to power with an
overwhelming majority. The voter turnout was the highest in the history of Bangladesh, at 85.26
per cent,50 confirming the people’s mandate and faith in democracy after two years of emergency
rule. Questions persisted about the constitutionality of the NCG, as its mandate was to undertake
routine government functions, and its main objective to hold democratic elections within ninety
days of its swearing in.51 Upon assuming power, the AL government passed the Fifteenth
Amendment to the Constitution which repealed the system of the NCG in Bangladesh. This was
the single most far-reaching and problematic legislative act of the Ninth Parliament.
The Fifteenth Amendment and the abolition of the NCG provision by the AL was particularly
disappointing because the NCG had initially been a demand of the AL (along with JI and JP) and
brought about by AL mobilization. Bangladesh faced months of violence and the economy came
to a standstill in 1996 because of the AL movement demanding a NCG to hold elections.52 People
rallied behind the AL at the time and gave Sheikh Hasina and her party overwhelming support
both in observing hartals and strikes and then in electing her and the AL to power.53 In fact,
Sheikh Hasina went on record stating that the NCG was her ‘brainchild’.54 The abolition of the NCG
by the AL makes their original demand in 1996, which had mass public support, seem
opportunistic and partisan. Rather than the NCG demand being one that showed the AL’s
commitment to furthering democracy, it now appears the demand for the NCG was for reasons of
party interest. By repealing the NCG provision when the AL had a supermajority in Parliament, it
has shown that it has no genuine commitment to the NCG as it claimed in 1996. Rather, the AL
45Joyeeta Bhattacharjee, A Year of Caretaker Government in Bangladesh, available at, http://www.observerindia.
com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/analysis/attachments/Bangladesh_Annual_Review_1202130305567.pdf,
(last accessed, 21 August 2014).
46Id.
47Hagerty, supra note 44, 177.
48Human Rights Watch, Bangladesh: Events of 2008 ,http://www.hrw.org/en/node/79296. (accessed on
26 August 2014).
49Bhattacharjee, supra note 45, at 1.
50Voter turnout data for Bangladesh, IDEA, available at, ,http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?
CountryCode¼BD . (accessed on 11 March 2014).
51AKM Masudul Haque, Emergency Powers and Caretaker Government in Bangladesh, 1 Journal of the Australasian
Law Teachers Association, 92 (2008) available at, , http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/JlALawTA/2008/9.pdf.
(accessed on 21 August 2014).
52Kochanek, supra note 30, at 137.
53Joseph Devine, NGOs, Politics and Grassroots Mobilisation: Evidence from Bangladesh, 1 Journal of South Asian
Development 77, 83 (2006).
54Abdur Razzaq, 13th Amendment and future of democracy, The Daily Star, 11 June 2011, available at, ,http://archi
ve.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid¼189434 . (accessed 7 September 2014).
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repealed the provision when it no longer served their political purpose of winning the election.
On the other hand, the BNPs current demand for elections under a NCG is weakened because it
too called the system undemocratic when it was in power and resisted enacting the Thirteenth
Amendment for as long as it could.55
Thus, the NCG provision has been one that political parties demand or reject based on political
expediency. Whenever a party is in power, it calls the NCG undemocratic and whenever it is in
opposition, it refuses to participate in elections unless held under a NCG. In line with this attitude
of the two major political parties to the NCG, the AL government abolished the NCG system in
2011 through the Fifteenth Amendment, despite the majority of Bangladeshis wanting elections
under a NCG.56 The abolition of the NCG system cleared the way for elections to be held under
the incumbent government. Thus, demand for the NCG has always been based on partisan and
momentary interest of political parties, and constitutional amendments in relation to the NCG has
been partisan and unreflective of the will of the people.
5. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. The Supreme Court Judgment
In Bangladesh, Parliament is often viewed as a forum for the government to pass laws for partisan
purposes.57 As discussed above, the tradition of strong, centralized executive power is enhanced
by structural features of the Bangladeshi parliamentary system: the tendency of elections to
produce large majority governments, opposition boycotts, and strong party discipline underlined
by the Article 70 constitutional ban on floor-crossing. Constitutional amendments, which require a
two-third majority, have a history of being passed without effective opposition in Parliament.
Like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment, which abolished the NCG system, was
passed amidst an opposition boycott of Parliament, with only one dissenting vote cast by an
independent member of Parliament.58 As a result, the judiciary became the institution seen as the
custodian of the Constitution and its values against encroachment by the executive government.59
In January 2000, a Supreme Court lawyer filed a writ petition with the High Court Division of the
Supreme Court challenging the Thirteenth Amendment on the grounds that it was “violative of
democracy, a basic and fundamental structure of the Constitution.”60 In 2004, the High Court
Division of the Supreme Court upheld the Thirteenth Amendment on the grounds that it had
“not affected or destroyed any basic structure or feature of the Constitution”61 because the NCG
provision did not negate democracy, in fact it was an aid to democracy because it allowed for
free, fair and acceptable elections.62 However, in 2005, an appeal against the High Court Division
ruling was filed with the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. On 10 May 2011, the Appellate
Division gave its verdict on the Thirteenth Amendment. In its verdict, the Appellate Division
declared the Thirteenth Amendment unconstitutional on the grounds that it allowed for an
unelected government to assume power and therefore was undemocratic and went against the
basic structure of the Constitution.63 The Appellate Division opined that:
[ . . . ] the basic constituent of our Constitution is the administration of the Republic
through their elected representatives. These two integral parts of the Constitution form a
basic element, which must be preserved and cannot be altered. The Parliament has power
to amend the Constitution but such power is subject to certain limitation, which is
apparent from a reading of the preamble. The broad contours of the basic elements and
fundamental features of the Constitution are delineated in the preamble.64
55Kochanek, supra note 30, at 138.
56T.J. Dhaka, Bangladeshi politics: Trench warfare, The Economist, 20 November 2013, available at, ,http://www.
economist.com/blogs/banyan/2013/11/bangladeshi-politics. (accessed 5 September 2014).
57Ahmed, supra note 24, at 62.
58Riaz, supra note 35, at 7.
59For an analysis of judicial constitutional activism please see, Ridwanul Hoque, Taking justice seriously: judicial
public interest and constitutional activism in Bangladesh, 15 Contemporary South Asia 399-422 (2006).
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Thus, according to the majority judgment of the Appellate Division, the protection of democracy,
which is a pledge in the preamble of the Constitution, means that the exercise of governmental
powers, even for a temporary period, by an unelected NCG is destructive of the democratic values
ensured by the Constitution. Further, the Supreme Court decided, that because Article 56 of the
Constitution states that if the President has to appoint a Prime Minister or Ministers in between
dissolution of Parliament and the next general election, only persons who were members of
Parliament immediately before the dissolution could be appointed,65 the appointment of a NCG
violated Article 56, as the NCG cabinet did not consist of members of Parliament.
The Appellate Division overturned the decision of the High Court on the grounds that all powers
belong to the people, and the people’s participation in the affairs of the state are ensured through
their elected representatives. According to the judgment, being represented by elected
representatives is the ‘main fabric’ of a parliamentary form of government. Thus, the ‘main fabric’
of the Constitution, which is that the people will be represented by elected representatives, cannot
be altered even for a short period.66
The Supreme Court of Bangladesh followed the basic structure jurisprudence since 1989,67 and
in the Thirteenth Amendment judgment, the court reiterated that, while Article 142 gives Parliament
the right to add, alter, substitute or repeal provisions of the Constitution through a two-third
majority, it does not give Parliament the right to abrogate, annul or change the basic features or
structures of the Constitution. The power to amend does not include the right to damage or
destroy the structure and the identity of the Constitution.
However, it also stated that the elections for the future Tenth and Eleventh Parliaments may be
held under the NCG system based on the principles quod alias non est licitum, necessitas licitum
facit68 (that which otherwise is not lawful, necessity makes lawful), salus populi suprema lex69
(safety of the people is the supreme law) and salus republicae est suprema lex70 (safety of the
State is the Supreme law). Thus, the Appellate Division left open a scope for the government to
hold elections under the NCG formula, at least in the immediately foreseeable elections in order to
avoid political violence and conflict. A proper reading of the judgment would recognize that the
Supreme Court advised that the removal of the NCG provision before the next election would put
the safety of the people and the State at risk.71
In his dissenting judgment, Abdul Wahab Miah J., declared that the Thirteenth Amendment was
constitutional. He stated that free and fair elections is a prerequisite for democracy, and that party
governments in Bangladesh, when in power, have used the government machinery to affect the
fairness of the election.72 According to Abdul Wahab Miah J., the Thirteenth Amendment was
passed to preserve and ensure democracy and effective participation of the people in the affairs
of the Republic and was a valid amendment of the Constitution. He further opined that the
Thirteenth Amendment did not amend Article 56 by appointing an interim cabinet consisting of
individuals who were not members of Parliament, but had “merely provided additional measures
to be operative during a very short period when the general parliamentary election would be
held.”73
During the hearing on the legality of the Thirteenth Amendment, eight of the most senior lawyers
in Bangladesh were called to submit their opinions as amici curiae.74 Out of the eight, five amici
curiae, Dr. Kamal Hossain, TH Khan, Mahmudul Islam, Amirul Islam and Rokanuddin Mahmud
recommended retaining the NCG system unchanged. Of those that recommended keeping the NCG
65Article 56, Constitution of Bangladesh
66Abdul Mannan Khan v. Bangladesh, Civil Appeal No. 139 of 2005 with Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No. 596
of 2005, 385.
67Anwar Hossain v. Bangladesh, 1989, 18 CLC (AD).
68Re: Constitution of Bangladesh (Thirteenth Amendment Act Case) ADC Vol. IX (A) (2012).
69Id.
70Id.
71Dr. Kamal Hossain, member of the constituent assembly of 1972, SC lawyer, former cabinet member of the AL.
This view was expressed during an interview conducted by the author on 20 December 2013. Interview on record
with author.
72Abdul Mannan Khan v. Bangladesh, Civil Appeal No. 139 of 2005 with Civil Petition for leave to appeal No. 596 of
2005, 535.
73Id.
74Ashutosh Sarkar, Caretaker system declared illegal, The Daily Star, 11 May 2011, available at, ,http://archive.
thedailystar.net/newDesign/cache/cached-news-details-185142.html. (accessed on 7 September 2014).
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provision as it is, Dr. Kamal Hossain and Amirul Islam were both members of the drafting
committee of the Bangladesh Constitution. Two suggested alternatives to the NCG formula, but
were in favour of keeping some sort of special election-time government in place. Only Ajmalul
Hossain QC argued against the NCG system and was in favour of holding elections under a
political government cabinet.75 The judges themselves were divided in their opinion: of the seven
judges of the Appellate Division, four declared the Thirteenth Amendment unconstitutional, and
three dissented. However, only a summary verdict was issued on 10 May 2011, in the form of a
unanimous judgment declaring the Amendment unconstitutional. The dissenting opinions were not
made public for another fourteen months, when the full judgment was released. Nonetheless, even
in the summary verdict, the judges gave weight to the view, expressed by the amici curiae, that
anarchy might ensue should the election be held under a party government and therefore allowed
the next two parliamentary elections to be held under a NCG, as long as Parliament amended the
provision to ensure that neither the former Chief Justices or other judges of the Appellate Division
would head the NCG.76
This ruling opened space for the AL government to abolish the NCG system and hold elections
under its administration. While it is hard to say what would have happened had the full verdict
and the dissenting opinions been released earlier, what we do know is that the government did
not wait for the publication of the full judgment before passing the Fifteenth Amendment, nor did
it pay heed to the advice of the amici curiae or the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court
about the conduct of elections under a partisan government. The concern in this regard is that the
AL government’s compliance with the Supreme Court ruling was tainted with opportunism serving
partisan interests. Under the terms of the ruling, it would have been legal to conduct the tenth
and eleventh parliamentary elections under the NCG system on the grounds of necessity and in
the interests of the safety of the state (on the condition that the provision for the former Chief
Justice and Appellate Division judges as head of the NCG was removed in order to prevent the
appearance of a politicized judiciary).
B. The Special Committee on the Fifteenth Amendment
It is a convention of the Westminster Parliament that small bodies of members, seen as
representing the House itself, are given “the consideration of questions, which, as involving points
of detail or questions of technical nature, are unsuited to the House as a whole.”77 This select
committee system helps to increase the efficiency of the legislature and save time in the House to
increase expertise, and, perhaps most importantly, increase legislative control over the government
by being more representative in partisan composition, having the ability to scrutinize bills in detail
and receive expert opinions. Members are also allowed to speak and vote against the party line
during committee meetings.78 Kaare Strøm characterizes parliamentary committees as “among the
most important features of legislative organization in contemporary democracies,”79 and Philip
Laundry notes that “all Parliaments work to a greater or lesser extent through committees.”80
Special committees are a feature of Bangladeshi parliamentary convention, also. Article 76(1) of
the Constitution provides that Parliament shall appoint from amongst its members, standing
committees for public accounts, privileges and such other standing committees as the Rules of
Procedure of Parliament require. Chapter 27 of the Rules of Procedure provides for special
committees for matters of public importance. Rule 209 of the Rules of Procedure provides that all
committees must prepare a report for presentation in front of the Parliament and Rule 206 sets
out that the deliberations and decisions taken during committee meetings in Bangladesh are to be
recorded.81 Unanimous decisions taken by parliamentary committees are usually recommended in
the final report. Despite the Rules of Procedure, Nizam Ahmed observes that the track record of
75Id.
76Re: Constitution of Bangladesh (Thirteenth Amendment Act Case) ADC Vol. IX (A) (2012).
77Malcolm Jack, Thomas Erskine May et al., Erskine May: Parliamentary Practice, 604 Butterworth Law (19th ed.,
1976).
78For a detailed understanding of the workings of the Committee system in Bangladesh, see, Nizam Ahmed,
Parliamentary Committees and parliamentary government in Bangladesh, 10 Contemporary South Asia 11–36 (2001).
79Kaare Strøm, Parliamentary Committees in European Democracies, 4 The Journal of Legislative Studies 1, 21
(1998).
80Philip Laundry, Parliaments in the Modern World, 96 (Dartmouth Publishing: Aldershot, 1989).
81Rule 206, Bangl. Rules of Procedure of Parliament.
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parliamentary committees in Bangladesh shows that structural/procedural, political, and
behavioural drawbacks discourage their effective working. According to Ahmed, “rarely are reports
produced by different committees debated in the House; hence the recommendations made in
these reports do not have any chance of being implemented.”82 However, traditionally, committees
in Bangladesh do submit reports to the Parliament and these reports contain the decisions taken
in the committee meetings.
The Special Committee on the Fifteenth Amendment (which abolished the NCG provision) would
seem to support this view. It failed to report on the rich debate and discussion that took place
during its meeting on the provision for a NCG.83 This author was able to get transcripts from the
fourteenth meeting of the Special Committee, held on 29 March 2011, of which the agenda was
“solely [to] assess the policy of the caretaker government regime.”84 The transcript shows that the
Committee, despite coming to an agreement about the NCG provision, failed to include this in its
final report, issued three months later, suggesting an inappropriate degree of influence by the
executive.
The Special Committee suffered from many of the problems observed with parliamentary
committees in Bangladesh. The Committee was formed on 21 July 2010 in accordance with
Ordinance 266 of the Ordinance of Parliamentary Proceedings upon a proposal being put forward
by the Prime Minister in order to support, advise, and give recommendations on the proposed
Fifteenth Amendment. The Committee comprised of fifteen members chaired by Sajeda Chowdhury,
Deputy Leader of the House and vice-chaired by Suranjit Sengupta, a senior AL politician. All but
three of the remaining members belonged to the ruling AL, the exceptions were Anisul Islam
Mahmud of the JP, Rashed Khan Menon of the Workers Party, and Hasanul Haq Inu of JASAD
(at the time of writing, the latter two members are Minister for Civil Aviation and Tourism and
Information (Media) in the current AL government). All three parties belonged to the ruling
coalition. The nature of the Ninth Parliament, in which the AL and its coalition partners held over
270 out of the 300 seats, demonstrates the difficulties facing parliamentary institutions such as
special committees that ordinarily provide a check on majoritarian and party politics in the
legislature.
To blame the ruling party alone and the nature of the Committee would be failing to see the
whole picture. The Committee heard expert opinions from all sectors of society—a first for
Bangladesh. Almost one hundred important personalities submitted opinions in front of the
Committee, including five former Chief Justices, eighteen renowned law and constitutional experts,
twenty-six academics and intellectuals, and twenty-six newspaper editors. Political parties also
submitted their opinion, amongst them representatives of the AL, JP, Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal,
Bangladesh Workers Party, Ganatantrik Party and Bangladesh National Awami Party (NAP).
However, all political parties in the BNP alliance failed to appear, despite receiving invitations
(with the exception of JI, which did not receive an invitation).
Khaleda Zia, in her reply to the invitation sent by Chairperson Sajeda Chowdhury,85 stated that
the BNPs refusal to participate was because the Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs made a
statement that the proposed Constitution, which was still to be passed by Parliament, was the
present Constitution of the country. It was only after receiving complaints against this statement
that the co-chairperson of the Special Committee clarified that this was a draft proposal to be
passed by Parliament. Thus, the BNP refused to participate in the Special Committee hearings
because it appeared that “the Committee was simply a farce in order to ensure the government’s
political gain.”86 This decision, however, deprived the Committee and eventually the legislature
and the people of the country of the BNP’s opinion in an official forum. Thus avoiding formal,
institutional expression of its dissent, the BNP again called on its followers to go to the streets
82Ahmed, supra note 24, at 29.
83Fourteenth meeting of the Special Committee, supra note 10.
84Fourteenth meeting of the Special Committee, supra note 10.
85Letter from Sajeda Chowdhury, Chairperson of the Special Committee for the Fifteenth Amendment to the
Constitution to Khaleda Zia dated 20 April 2011, Matter No. 11.412.009.29.01.029.2010.122. A copy of the letter is on
file with author. Translation is the author’s own.
86Letter from Khaleda Zia to Chairperson of the Special Committee for the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution
dated 24 April 2011, Matter No. 1(1)11/ letter/80. A copy of the letter is on file with the author. Translation is the
author’s own.
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once the Fifteenth Amendment was passed. This is a common phenomenon in Bangladesh, where
politics is taken out of Parliament and to the streets through parliamentary boycotts. The reasons
behind this are manifold, including the extreme dominance of Parliament by the government, the
ban on floor-crossing, the rejection of opposition motions and not giving opposition MPs a fair
chance to speak.87
Despite lack of input from the opposition, the Special Committee during its fourteenth meeting,
which was held with the sole purpose of discussing the Thirteenth Amendment, was
overwhelmingly in favour of leaving the NCG provision in place. While there was some debate on
how the head of the NCG and the advisors would be chosen, who could head the NCG, the tenure
of the NCG and how to limit its capacity to declare a state of emergency, almost every member
except Fazle Rabbi Miah, were in favour of leaving the NCG system in place for at least the tenth
parliamentary election. In his concluding remarks at the end of the meeting, Suranjit Sengupta, the
co-chairperson stated that, “[w]e all agree that in spite of all the limitations of the present system
of the NCG, the conclusion is that it should remain.”88
The impression that party political influence interfered with the proper functioning of the Special
Committee is bolstered by the fact that the final report of the Special Committee does not contain
the decision of the fourteenth meeting, and mentions nothing at all about the NCG provision.
The Special Committee submitted its final report to Parliament on 5 June 2011, after a year of
deliberations and discussion on the Fifteenth Amendment. In this report, the Committee gave
fifty-one recommendations on different provisions of the Constitution, including changes to the
preamble, to the section on state religion, freedom of religion, trial of war criminals, women’s
representation in Parliament, presidential powers, selection of Supreme Court judges, limitations
on state of emergency, and much more. However, no mention of the NCG provision was made at
all. This is odd because, even though many of the recommended amendments went against the
basic platform of the BNP, the BNP’s greatest opposition at the time was the issue of the deletion
of the Thirteenth Amendment.89
Following the report and a parallel report from the Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs
Standing Committee discussing the draft Bill, the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Bill 2011 was
finalised. The salient features of the Bill included the abolition of the NCG system, that elections
be held under the incumbent cabinet, that Islam be retained as state religion (but that all other
religions be given ‘equal status’), that ‘Bismillah-Ar-Rahman-Ar Rahim’ be retained in the preamble,
that Article 12 be revived to restore secularism and freedom of religion, that the people of
Bangladesh be defined as ‘Bangalees’ and the citizens of the country be known as ‘Bangladeshi’,
that Article 7A and 7B be inserted into the Constitution to make the abrogation or suspension of
the Constitution an offence in order to end the takeover of power through extra-constitutional
means, and to declare that the basic provisions of the Constitution are not amendable. The Bill
also clarified that elections would have to be held within ninety days of the dissolution of
Parliament and increased the number of reserved seats for women.
Much of the advice of the Committee was included in the Fifteenth Amendment, suggesting that
the failure of the Committee to make any statement about the NCG despite extensive submissions
and discussion was opportunistic; in the end, this lent the Thirteenth Amendment the legitimacy of
both a Special Committee report and a Supreme Court judgment, but the Amendment itself was
made in disregard of important qualifications and recommendations made in both.
The abolition of the NCG, in turn, led Bangladesh to the crisis it faced in the months leading up
to the 5 January 2014 elections, and to yet another election boycotted by opposition parties.90
This is contributing to a trend which brings into question the nature of democracy in Bangladesh,
and gives rise to doubts about the democratic legitimacy of the Bangladesh Parliament, to which
this article now turns.
87Moniruzzaman, supra note 18 at 92.
88Fourteenth meeting of the Special Committee, supra note 10 at 4.40. All translations are the author’s own.
89Interview with Khaleda Zia, Bangladesh will never be a safe haven for militants, The Telegraph, 16 March 2014,
available at, ,http://www.telegraphindia.com/1140316/jsp/7days/18086545.jsp. (accessed 19 March 2014).
90See generally, Ole Solvang, Democracy in the crossfire: opposition violence and government abuses in the 2014
pre- and post-election period in Bangladesh (Human Rights Watch: New York, 2014).
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6. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT
Since the enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment, opposition parties have argued for the
reinstatement of the NCG provisions and have threatened to boycott any elections held under the
ruling party’s administration. Finally, on 2 December 2013, following weeks of violent protests,
strikes and hartals, the BNP and its eighteen-party alliance announced that it would boycott the
5 January 2014 elections. With the government refusing to reinstate the NCG provisions and the
opposition refusing to accept any election without it, the United Nations became involved in order
to attempt to break the deadlock after the death of an estimated 200 people since late October
2013 in election-related violence.91 From 6-9 December 2013, UN Assistant Secretary General for
Political Affairs, Oscar Taranco, visited Dhaka, meeting with the Prime Minister, the Foreign
Minister, and leaders of major political parties, including Khaleda Zia. He also met with the
Chief Election Commissioner and representatives of civil society, the media and the diplomatic
community to exchange views and to stress that the next national election should be peaceful,
inclusive, and credible, giving voters real choice at the polls.92 Taranco’s visit, however, failed to
create any consensus between the government and the opposition.93 The Prime Minister proposed
an ‘all party’ caretaker government, stating that, rather than amending the constitution again
against the judgment of the Supreme Court, an all-party cabinet could be sworn in with her as the
head of the cabinet.94 She offered the BNP any ministry they wanted, but insisted that the BNP
should join elections within the present constitutional framework. However, the BNP refused to
join in any election under any government headed by the Prime Minister, instead insisting on a
‘non-party’ caretaker government provision—which would require another constitutional
amendment. The Election Commission had, at this time, already announced the election schedule
and the government refused to postpone elections in order to negotiate with the BNP.
Even until a week before elections, civil society in Bangladesh was hurriedly scrabbling to seek
a postponement of the elections and make the two parties come to some sort of consensus in
order to hold an inclusive and democratic election. On 28 December 2013, a citizen’s dialogue
was held at the Lake Shore Hotel, arranged jointly by the Centre for Policy Dialogue, Sushashoner
Jonno Nagorik (SUJAN), Ain O Salish Kendra (ASK) and Transparency International Bangladesh.
The theme of this dialogue was ‘Bangladesh in Crisis: Citizens’ Concern.’ More than sixty civil
society, academic, and business community members spoke at the occasion, and agreed
overwhelmingly that the 5 January elections needed to be postponed, and some sort of political
agreement was needed in order to hold an inclusive, democratic election. The main demands of
citizens from all sectors appeared to be a stop to the political violence, the postponement of the
5 January election, and the continuation of dialogue between political parties in order to hold an
election with bipartisan participation. The government claimed that the election had to be held on
5 January because Parliament had already been dissolved.95 Members of the citizens’ dialogue, for
example, respected constitutional lawyer, Rafiqul Haque’s claimed that the elections could be
deferred up to ninety days even after the dissolution of the Ninth Parliament under the
constitutional framework.96
Despite this urging from civil society, the business community, and the international community,
the AL government went ahead with the 5 January 2014 election. Leading up to election day,
opposition groups declared a series of strikes and hartals, which often became violent. Protestors
burned buses and cars that defied the strikes, and the police shot at protestors. On polling day
91Tahmima Anam, Bangladesh’s Non-Election, The New York Times, 28 Jan. 2014, available at, ,http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/01/29/opinion/anam-bangladeshs-non-election.html?_r¼0 . (accessed 14 April 2014).
92Bangladesh Mission by Mr. Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, 6–9
December 2013, Report by UNDP, available at, ,http://www.bd.undp.org/content/bangladesh/en/home/presscenter/
pressreleases/2012/12/09/bangladesh-mission-by-mr-oscar-fernandez-taranco-assistant-secretary-general-for-political-
affairs-6-9-december-2012-/. (accessed 20 April 2014).
93Imperative following Taranco’s failed mission, The Bangladesh Today, 12 December 2013, available at, ,http://
thebangladeshtoday.com/news/2013/12/imperative-following-tarancos-failed-mission/. (accessed on 20 April 2014).
94Bangladesh PM Hasina proposes all-party election cabinet, BBC New Asia, 18 October 2013, available at,
,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24583020. (accessed on 26 August 2014).
95Q&A: Bangladesh general elections, BBC News Asia, 3 January 2014, available at, ,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-25584962. (accessed 8 September 2014).
96Press Report on the dialogue, Bangladesh in Crisis: Citizens’ Concerns, Centre for Policy Dialogue, 29 December
2013, Dhaka.
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itself there were eighteen deaths due to election-related violence; polling stations were torched,
and voter turnout was low. There were allegations that even under these circumstances, vote-
stealing was taking place in some polling centres, and the BNP termed the elections a ‘scandalous
farce.’97
The Tenth Parliament was sworn in on 12 January 2014, again following an election without
participation by the major opposition parties. One hundred and fifty-three seats were uncontested.
An opposition was formed by Rowshan Ershad of the JP, who joined the election with her own,
following in defiance of Muhammad Ershad’s (Head of the JP) directions. In sum, Bangladesh now
has a Parliament without effective opposition, and all MPs actually belong to the same political
alliance. The major opposition party in Bangladesh has been marginalized, their leaders arrested
on vague charges, and fear is currently growing around the government becoming increasingly
authoritarian.98
7. CONCLUSION
The narrative of constitutional amendments in Bangladesh, especially in relation to the NCG is a
reflection of the broader malaise of politics in the country. The crux of the pathology of politics in
Bangladesh lies in the inherent belief of dynastic political leaders in their right to rule and their
conviction that the opposition has no legitimate right to participate in politics. Both Sheikh Hasina,
who is the daughter of Sheikh Mujib and Khaleda Zia, who is the widow of Ziaur Rahman,
question the very legitimacy of the other to exist, let alone to play a role in politics, as discussed
above. The dynastic mindset of political leaders coupled by a culture of patronage and charismatic
rule has led to the failure of internal democracy within political parties and sycophantic conformity
from party members. Leadership positions have never been challenged, even when parties have
suffered defeat in general elections. This leads to the complete centralisation of power in the
hands of the leadership. Rahaman notes that “[t]here is no example in our recent political history
that any leader of these two parties has braved to oppose any proposal or decision of their chiefs.
They (the chiefs) remain the key sources of power in their parties.”99
The dynastic mindset of leaders along with Bangladesh’s first-past-the-post majoritarian system
of government, which leads to party dualism, has further sealed the arrogance of the leadership of
the AL and the BNP. Given the extreme centralisation of power backed by voting patterns and
institutional structures that allow ruling parties to monopolize the Parliament, it is hardly surprising
that the story of the NCG has played out as it has. Despite over twenty years of democratic rule in
Bangladesh, political parties are not yet comfortable with the principles of democracy and
constitutionalism. Political leaders view elections more as a reaffirmation of their right to lead
rather than the methodology by which the people express their choice of leaders. Thus, whenever
the people have chosen the ‘other’, political leaders have rejected election results causing
agitation on the streets. Indeed, to date there has not been a single election in democratic
Bangladesh, held under a political government, that has not resulted in a win for the incumbent.
Neither has there been a single election held under a NCG that did not result in an alternation of
power.
This brings the paper to its conclusion on when political parties have made a demand for the
NCG or rejected it as undemocratic. The NCG was a demand of the AL when in opposition,
because at the time it needed an institution in place that could be trusted to hold free and fair
elections. Today, it is the AL that has removed the NCG provision and called it undemocratic.
Thus, as far as the NCG is concerned, arguments over its place in the democratic Constitution of
Bangladesh and demands for amendments in relation to it, have been made dependant upon
political expediency. While the AL demand for a NCG in 1996 was a demand backed by popular
support, the Fifteenth Amendment and its removal of the NCG provision by an AL government
brings to question the current AL government’s motive. The BNP’s resistance to the Fifteenth
97Mahfuz Sidique, Clashes and boycott mar Bangladesh election, BBC News Asia, 5 January 2014, available at,
,http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25602436. [accessed on 2 April 2014].
98‘Bangladesh: A Tragic Backward Slide on Human Rights’, Human Rights Watch, 21 January 2014 ,http://www.
hrw.org/news/2014/01/21/bangladesh-tragic-backward-slide-human-rights. (accessed 26 August 2014).
99Muhammad Rahaman, Origins and Pitfalls of Confrontational Politics in Bangladesh, 14 South Asian Survey 101
(2007).
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Amendment illustrates its own motives of expediency; the BNP used similar arguments to resist
the NCG in 1996 as the AL is using today.
Further, the manner in which each of the constitutional amendments have been passed in
relation to the NCG also point to the pathologies of politics in Bangladesh. It would appear that
executive control of the legislature (as the amendatory organ) has seen these Amendments
passed despite resistance by opposition parties and civil society. In passing the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, constitutional institutions have been used as an instrument of executive
power rather than serving as a source of checks and balances. The Fourteenth Amendment made
the judiciary and judicial appointments controversial when it raised the retirement age of Supreme
Court judges, quite possibly in order to ensure that the last retired Chief Justice would be partial
to the incumbent. When passing the Fifteenth Amendment, the government used the Supreme
Court and the parliamentary Special Committee to justify the amendment. Both Amendments were
passed without regard to the violence and political deadlock they would ensue, and the
recommendation of the Supreme Court was disregarded. The primary consideration seems to have
been securing elections under the incumbent’s administration in order to continue to rule. This, in
turn, subverted the right of citizens to choose their government by ensuring that no serious
opposition parties would participate in the 2014 election. The Special Committee’s failure to
mention the NCG in its final report in 2011 is a further confirmation of the level of executive
control over what is meant to be an institution of accountability. Despite unanimous agreement
amongst the Special Committee members to retain the NCG provision, its failure to mention this
decision in the final report reeks of executive interference and sycophantic conformity.
The ‘all or nothing’ nature of Westminster parliamentarism, whereby it produces clear winners
and losers, serves to raise the political stakes. This is difficult to reconcile with the feudalistic
foundations of Bangladeshi politics, its historical lack of democratic institutionalisation, and the
associated pathological issues that characterize political incentives in the country. Westminster
parliamentarism, combined with the forces that shape political incentives in Bangladesh, serve to
doubly raise the stakes of political contest. As Budge and McKay note, the Westminster system
has been discarded in most of Britain’s former colonies because of its inability to cope with
regional divisions.100 Bangladesh may not have regional or ethnic divisions, but so long as politics
continue to be characterized by patrimonial dynasties that propagate histories and identities that
are antithetical to each other, the winner-take-all dynamic will continue. Provisions such as the
NCG and constitutional amendments will continue to fall prey to the machinations of political party
interests and their demand for perpetual rule and unchallenged authority.
100Ian Budge and David H. McKay, Developing democracy: Comparative research in honor of J.F.P Blondel
(Sage, London, 1994) 199.
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